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The aim of this paper is to analyze the relationship between welfare expenditure by 
government and unemployment outcomes. Using a panel of 34 OECD countries from 
1980 to 2010 and a two-way fixed effect model for panel data subject to endogeneity test 
and persistence test, the results of the paper suggest that total welfare expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP has a statistically significant positive impact on unemployment 
outcomes (total unemployment, long-term unemployment and youth unemployment). 
Among the four major components of national welfare expenditure, only income support 
and pension benefit are found to have the significant positive effect on all unemployment 
outcomes, public expenditure on health services has marginally significant positive 
impact on total unemployment rate, but not on long-term unemployment rate and youth 
unemployment rate and public social expenditures on other social services provided by 
government have no significant impact on unemployment. The econometric estimation 
results also provide evidence to support the hypothesis that one channel through which 
public social expenditure impacts unemployment is investment rate and the hypothesis 
that immigration can decrease a nation’s total unemployment rate.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between welfare expenditure of government and unemployment rate was 
not given full investigation despite huge literature on the relationship between labor 
market institutions and unemployment. Although these two areas of study are closely 
linked to each other, the examination of the former is more fundamental: what is the 
economic impact of welfare state in terms of unemployment?  
The impact of welfare state on economy is a long-standing debate. For decades, the 
economic impact of Europe’s socialist (or “social democratic”) welfare state has been 
fiercely debated among economists and politicians of left wing and right wing. If 
econometric studies on this impact could be based on randomized experimental data like 
clinical trials, such debate would never emerge. Unfortunately, facing only observational 
data, with very little opportunity of applying “natural experiments”, the only option to get 
valid (consistent) econometric estimation is to use instrumental variable (IV), at least for 
endogeneity test and fixed effect model for panel data to control for country-specific 
heterogeneity or country-common global trend. Many econometric issues may bias the 
estimation of the effects of welfare spending measures on growth. As a result, the 
findings of previous empirical literature are mixed and inconclusive. The following 
section on literature review will show such problems in some previous econometric 
studies on the relationship between labor market performance and welfare state. 
 
II. BASIC THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Generally, economic theory concerning the economic role of government has never 
reached consensus between Keynesian economists and Hayek school economists. What is 
the impact of government welfare spending in the short run? As Disney (2000) 
summarized, in a Keynesian setting, a tax-financed increase in welfare spending should 
have a modest expansionary impact on employment and output, so long as there are spare 
resources. In a static Neoclassical model, however, such public spending can completely 
displace private spending, so labor supply may depend on the net-of-tax replacement rate 
of earnings to out-of-work benefits. Atkinson (1995) also emphasized the importance of 
this benefit replacement rate (BRR) to unemployment and his imperfect labor market 
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model shows that the effect of unemployment insurance on employment depends on the 
level of BRR and extent of benefit coverage.  
Alesina and Perotti (1994) used a general equilibrium, two-country model with 
exportables, importables and nontradables to study redistribution across different types of 
agents in a world characterized by the presence of labor unions and distortionary taxation. 
They reveal that an increase in transfers to, say, retirees, financed by distortionary 
taxation, can generate a loss of competitiveness (defined as an increase in relative unit 
labor costs for tradable goods), an appreciation of the relative price of nontradables, and a 
decrease in employment in all sectors of the domestic economy.  
On the other hand, Ljungqvist and Sargent (1995) constructed a search model where the 
government both provides liberal unemployment insurance and taxes labor at high 
progressive tax rates. They showed how progressive income taxation can counteract a 
high unemployment rate under generous unemployment insurance. In particular, high 
marginal taxes reduce workers' incentives to switch jobs in response to changing 
economic opportunities. This lower labor mobility reduces unemployment but at the cost 
of a less efficient labor allocation. In short, their theory does not indicate whether the net 
effect of unemployment insurance and income tax is positive or negative. 
This paper is not about this theoretical debate, but on in-depth investigation of empirical 
evidences on the economic impacts of welfare states on employment in terms of public 
social welfare expenditures.  Despite huge literature on the relationship between welfare 
spending and economic growth in terms of either level or growth rate of GDP or per 
capita GDP (see for example, Grier and Tullock (1989), Atkinson (1995), Agell et al. 
(1997), Beraldo et. al. (2009)), research on whether expenditure on welfare benefit 
programs in welfare state affects unemployment is not plentiful, surprisingly, particularly 
in face of great gap in average unemployment rate between EU nations and the US since 
late 1970s. Disney (2000) summarized five previous studies on macroeconomic evidence 
on tax and welfare policy and unemployment, but most of them concern tax policy 
variables (tax wedge or tax rate) and benefit replacement rate rather than specifically 
addressing the economic effect of welfare spending rate.  
More generally, Atkinson’s book (1995) argues that there is very little correlation 
between economic performance and welfare expenditure. Headey et al. (2000) also 
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provided empirical evidence based on the economic performance of the United States, 
Germany and the Netherlands to support the view that there is no necessary trade-off 
between economic efficiency and a generous welfare state. Lindert (2003) even directly 
claimed that welfare state is a free lunch because there is no clear net GDP cost of high 
tax-based social spending on GDP. However, some econometric problems in his 
empirical findings cast doubt on validity of his econometric estimations. For example, he 
used two-stage-least-square (2SLS) estimation for the regression of per capita GDP 
growth in which the instrumental variables (IVs) he used for social spending and tax rates 
are age distribution, voter turnout rates, average income, religion, ethnic fractionalization, 
and openness to trade. It seems that we can have sufficient reasons to suspect exgoeneity 
of these IVs for at least some of them are almost certain to be correlated to unobservable 
or omitted potential determinants of income growth. For example, a country with higher 
proportion of youth, and higher openness to international trade tends to have higher 
growth.  Also, the effect of religion on economy is widely accepted (see for example, 
Barro, McCleary  (2003)). Average income, of course receives feedback effect from GDP 
growth rate. Endogenous explanatory variable(s) may lead to bias, but if instrument 
variable is not truly exogenous, the IV estimate’s bias is even larger than OLS estimate. 
Similar problems may also exist in other findings of no correlation between growth and 
welfare spending or public sector size. For example, Agell et al. (1997) claimed that 
theoretical and empirical evidence does not allow any conclusion on whether there is a 
relationship between the rate of economic growth and the size of the public sector. In 
view of their econometric finding, Stefan and Magnus (1999) argued that Agell et al. base 
their conclusion on empirical studies, and on their own regressions, without evaluating 
the econometric problems that arise. They extended Agell et al.’s review in order to 
highlight some of these problems and presented evidence showing that once a number of 
econometric issues are dealt with, the relationship between growth and public 
expenditure may be more robustly negative than it first appears. 
A closely related field sees much more abundant literature: the economic impact of labor 
market institutions on employment. The empirical studies in this field also yield mixed 
results and unresolved debate, particularly since the publication of IMF’s report (2003), 
which used an empirical model of labor market institutions on unemployment to conclude 
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that rigid labor market institutions in welfare state induce higher unemployment. The 
OECD Employment Outlook (2006) presented a similar econometric analysis of 
regressions of unemployment rate on the labor market institutions variables (average 
replacement rate, tax wedge, union density, employment protection index, benefit 
duration and labor tax rate) and provided similar conclusion as that of IMF (2003). This 
study also referenced other studies with findings that the level and duration of 
unemployment benefits have a detrimental impact on unemployment (Scarpetta, 1996; 
Nickell, 1998; Elmeskov et al., 1998; Nunziata, 2002) and empirical studies with findings 
that high labour taxes tend to increase unemployment rates (Belot and van Ours, 2004; 
Nickell, 1997) despite other less conclusive studies (Scarpetta, 1996; Nunziata, 2002; Di 
Tella and MacCulloch, 2005). 
However, other researchers argued that the positive correlation between rigidity of labor 
market institutions and unemployment is not robust to changes of specification or data, 
see for example Baker, Glyn, Howell, and Schmitt (2002, 2004). They think this 
conventional view is intuitive thus too simple to represent the complexity of reality and 
cross-national evidence is weak and fragile. As James Heckman (2007) commented, they 
did not prove that institutions do not cause the pattern of European unemployment. 
Instead, they showed that the current data base and models are too weak to decide the 
issue. The differences in conclusions of these studies may be traced back to different 
econometric processing methods applied to the same (or similar) original OECD panel 
data. 
Because the key variable of interest in this paper is public social expenditure and four 
major components of this total welfare spending: income support, pension benefits, 
public health and other social services, which are quite different from labor institution 
variables mentioned above, I do not want to go into details on the econometric problems 
in BGHS’s critical work. One point which is striking and worthy of mentioning is their 
inadequate attention to the problems of reverse causality and omitted variable bias. Both 
sides of the debate did not address properly the potential endogeniety problem from these 
two sources. That is the main motivation of my using Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity 
test before constructing final model in this paper. 
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As mentioned before, despite heated debate on economic impacts and performance of 
welfare states, rigorous econometric studies on the relationship between structural 
unemployment and social welfare expenditure in developed countries are limited in both 
quantity and quality. Particularly, no previous study specifically addressed potential 
endogeneity problem in panel data regressions, so we do not know if the estimates of the 
variables of interest are unbiased or consistent due to omitted variable bias or reverse 
causality. What is more important is no previous study explored in depth to reveal the 
mechanism (or channel) through which welfare expenditure affects employment.  
This paper aims to fill this blank by using two-way fixed effect (FE) estimation for panel 
data of all OECD nations using the latest data from official sources (see table 1), with 
instrument variable used for endogeneity test and a set of robustness checks subject to the 
model. The response variables of these FE regressions include unemployment, long-term 
unemployment rate, youth unemployment rate and investment rate, the last of which is 
used to test the hypothesis that welfare spending impacts employment through the 
channel of investment rate.  
The paper contributes to the empirical literature on the effects of welfare state on 
unemployment in three respects. First, it analyzed the impacts of welfare expenditure by 
government at both sub-component level and aggregate level for the first time, i.e., it 
examines the four major components of welfare spending (income support, expenditures 
on pension, public health and other public social services) and total welfare spending 
separately. The public social welfare expenditure is a composite concept thus some part 
of this transfer payment system (such as public welfare expenditure on education) is 
likely to have positive impact while other components may have negative effects. The 
separate and overall effects of the four components of total welfare spending are 
investigated. Both the level and structure indicators of unemployment are used, the latter 
of which refers to long-term unemployment rate representing duration structure and 
youth unemployment rate representing age structure. Second, for the first time, possible 
endogeneity and reverse causality from unemployment to welfare spending are formally 
tested and if endogeneity is found, IV estimation for panel data is used to correct for OLS 
bias. Third, for the first time, the paper explores the channel through which welfare 
spending impacts unemployment, specifically the effects on investment rate. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section III we discuss the four welfare 
variables, the data and other variables used in our estimations. Section IV presents the 
process of the model building, including two econometric tests for model specification. 
Section V describes the results. Section VI conducts a set of robustness tests and 
sensitivity analysis. Finally, Section VII summarizes the main findings and discusses 
some potential policy implications. 
 
III THE WELFARE AND THE DATA 
The “welfare” in the concept of welfare state used in this paper refers to public social 
spending, which measures the amount of resources committed by the government in the 
areas of pensions, benefits (social support) and health. A traditional argument for much 
social spending is to prevent disadvantage and thus enhance equity.  
This study is based on a panel model of all 34 OECD member states: The OECD Social 
Expenditure Database. Social expenditure is classified as public when general 
government (i.e. central administration, local governments and social security 
institutions) controls the financial flows. For example, sickness benefits financed by 
compulsory contributions from employers and employees to social insurance funds are 
considered “public”, whereas sickness benefits paid directly by employers to their 
employees are classified as “private”. 
According to this data, public social expenditure averaged 19% of GDP across 34 OECD 
countries in 2007. Country differences in spending levels were wide. Mexico and Korea 
spent between 6 and 10% of GDP. France and Sweden spent about 20 percentage points 
more. Public spending is a feature of the continental European countries. Between 1982 
and 2007, this ratio has risen by 2.5 percentage points on average across OECD 
countries. 
According to OECD (2011), countries with a more equal income distribution, as 
measured by the Gini coefficient, tended to have higher social spending, however, bigger 
rises in social spending experienced over the last generation in some countries do not 
appear to have contributed to reductions in income inequality. 
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As for the composition of welfare expenditure, the largest category of public social 
spending concerns old-age and survivor pensions: on average across the OECD, 
amounting to almost 7% of GDP. On average across the OECD, income transfers to the 
working-age population amounted to almost 5% of GDP, and within the latter category, 
public spending targeted to families with children and to persons on unemployment 
benefits each represented nearly 1.3% of GDP. On average public expenditure on health 
services amounted to 6% of GDP in 2003 while spending on other social services was 
about 2% of GDP. 
The variables used in this paper, data source and time coverage of each variable are 
presented in table 1. Four variables are used to represent welfare state: public social 
welfare expenditure as a percentage of GDP (public_social) and four components of it: 1) 
income support to households which do not have sufficient other resources to support 
themselves (income_support), 2) pension expenditure to the old-age and survivor 
(pension_exp), 3) public expenditure on health services (health_exp) and 4) spending on 
other social services (otherwelf). All the welfare measures are in percentage of GDP. 
Welfare expenditure rate is a better measure for welfare state than government 
consumption as percentage of GDP because government purchases of goods and services 
for citizens financed by tax may have significant externality benefits (for example, 
through education and R&D) while welfare spending is more relevant to transfer payment 
part of government spending, which is more likely to affect individual’s incentive to 
work or individual firm’s incentive to make investment. Therefore welfare spending rate 
is a better measure for non-productive effect of government intervention in economy, 
which is the interest of this paper. Government expenditure rate, however is a more 
general measure of the scale of welfare state or entitlement society, which represents the 
overall net impact of government intervention in economy and will be examined in the 
section of robustness check and sensitivity analysis. 
The main data source of welfare expenditure and its components, OECD Social 
Expenditure database covers the years 1980 – 2010. Over this period, public social 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP, on average across OECD, increased from 15.6% to 
19.2%. Public pension spending (6.4% of GDP) and public health expenditure (5.8% of 
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GDP) are the largest social spending items (Adema et. al. (2001)). The data of welfare 
variables between 2008 and 2012 are projected by OECD. 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in the paper. Table 2 presents 
the correlation between unemployment outcomes and the welfare spending indicators. 
The correlation between unemployment outcomes and welfare expenditure indicators is 
in most of the cases positive and statistically significant. The only two exceptions are 
statistically non-significant correlations between spending rate of public health welfare 
and youth unemployment rate and between spending rate of other public social services 
and total unemployment rate. Since the spending rate of other social services is a 
composite indicator including various welfare programs, this may implies that some of 
them are likely to have positive impact on unemployment while others have negative 
effects, the overall effect is neutral.  
 
IV. THE MODEL BUILDING 
The specification of the baseline model used in this paper is: 
        itiitittit ucwxy ++++= δγθ          t=1,2,…,T                                             (1) 
where ity  is the unemployment rate (total, youth, or long-term unemployment) for 
country i at time t. itx  is 1 x 6 vector and contains 6 observable explanatory variables 
which are assumed to be strictly exogenous, including labor productivity growth rate 
(labor_prodg), terms of trade shock (dtot), inflation rate (inflation), long real interest rate 
(long_real_r), international trade openness (trade_open) and population density (popd). 
itw is the key variable of interest: one of five welfare measures (public_social, 
pension_exp, health_exp, income_support and otherwelf), which may be endogenous. i
c
 
represent country fixed effects that capture unobserved country-specific determinants of 
unemployment, which may include some variables with high time constancy, such as 
national cultural attitude(tradition) towards trade-off between work and leisure or 
national cultural attitude towards importance of equality of result or equality of 
opportunity. tθ  is a fixed effect term for aggregate time, which captures global trend of 
some growth determinants that are common to all OECD countries, such as worldwide 
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technology progress or global economic downturns or booms. it
u
 are idiosyncratic errors, 
which also absorb some time-varying omitted variables, such as home ownership (as 
pointed out by OECD (2006, p218), Home ownership is correlated with unemployment). 
This is a two-way fixed effect model for unbalanced panel data. The reason to choose 
fixed effect (FE) model rather than random effect (RE) model is for controlling 
unobservable time-invariant country heterogeneity and global time trend of technology 
despite the fact that RE estimator may have higher efficiency than FE estimator when 
unobservables are not correlated with included explanatory variables. The choice of first 
four control variables (labor_prodg, dtot, inflation, long_real_r) closely follows IMF 
(2003) and OECD (2006). The inclusion of trade openness and population density as 
control variables for unemployment rates follows Bernal-Verdugo et. al.(2012). 
Felbermayr et. al. (2009) also find that higher trade openness is causally associated to a 
lower structural rate of unemployment. 
The implementation of this two-way FE model is the classical approach of Least Squares 
Dummy Variable Regression (LSDV): adding two sets of dummy variables for country 
and year, respectively to the OLS regression of (1).  
 
IV.I Test Endogeneity of Welfare Variables 
It is likely that changes in unemployment or economic growth induce changes in welfare 
spending. Higher unemployment is always accompanied by lower GDP growth, which is 
translated to lower tax income for government, which in turn may decrease welfare 
expenditure due to more scarce resources for re-allocation. Beraldo et. al. (2009) point 
out that a well documented stylized fact is that (total) expenditure in health rises with per 
capita GDP. On the other hand, opposite effect may arise through another channel: higher 
unemployment and lower growth indicate bad economy, fewer job opportunities and 
lower income for working people, so it may be an incentive for dependence on welfare 
benefits, particularly unemployment benefits. In short, there may exist reverse causality 
or feedback effect from unemployment rate to welfare expenditure, which violates strict 
exogeneity assumption for the welfare indicators for OLS estimation. If this assumption 
fails, the consistency of FE estimates on welfare variables is questionable. The Omitted 
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variables, whose data is unavailable or unobservable to us, may also be the source of 
endogeneity, as discussed before. 
I apply classical Durbin–Wu–Hausman (DWH) test to check whether welfare spending is 
endogenous in our regressions for unemployment rates thus whether IV estimation is 
necessary. Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) suggest an augmented regression test, which 
can easily be formed by including the residuals of each endogenous right-hand side 
variable, as a function of all exogenous variables and instrument variable(s), in a 
regression of the original model. The key requirement for this approach is that we can 
correctly identify all other strictly exogenous variables except suspicious endogenous 
variable(s) and we can find a valid IV.  We assume that all explanatory variables in itx of 
(1) are strictly exogenous and we suspect that welfare measure in itw  may be endogenous. 
The IV has to be strongly correlated to itw but has no direct impact on y (is uncorrelated 
with the unobservable error it
u
). 
The choice of IV is the trickiest part of DWH test or IV regression. Beraldo et. al. used 
lagged values (up to three period) of possibly endogenous variables (health spending 
variables). These IVs are of course strongly correlated with endogenous variables but the 
exogeneity of them is highly suspicious. Using lagged values of possibly endogenous 
variables as instruments is never an appropriate way to ensure strictly exogeneity of the 
instruments for panel data. As Angrist & Krueger (2001) pointed out, “One of the most 
mechanical and naive, yet common, approaches to the choice of instruments uses 
atheoretical and hard-to-assess assumptions about dynamic relationships to construct 
instruments from lagged variables in time series or panel data. The use of lagged 
endogenous variables…is problematic if the equation error or omitted variables are 
serially correlated”. It is easy to verify that unemployment rate regressions always have 
residual errors serially correlated. So Beraldo et.al. (2009)’s approach of using one to 
three period lagged values of endogenous variable (health spending expenditure) as 
instrument variables makes the exogeneity of these IVs very questionable. 
The instrument variable (IV) chosen for welfare variables in this paper is road fatalities 
per million inhabitants (road) whose data comes from OECD Factbook 2010. Road 
fatality means any person killed immediately or dying within 30 days as a result of a road 
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injury accident. Suicides involving the use of a road motor vehicle are excluded. The 
justification of the validity of this IV is elaborated as follows. 
Death rate from road accidents presumably cannot affect unemployment and seems to 
have nothing to do with the omitted variables that affect unemployment rate, such as 
home ownership. However, this rate may be related to welfare spending rate in this way: 
in welfare states with higher welfare expenditure by government and more generous 
welfare benefit programs, people tend to have more leisure time and slower life pace. To 
prove this, a simple fixed effect model of hours on each welfare variable is run where 
hours, as defined before, is average hours actually worked per year per person in 
employment. The first five rows of table 4 clearly show that average annual hours 
actually worked per worker in OECD nations have strong negative association with total 
welfare spending rate and its four components. The estimate of public_social indicates 
that on average, in an OECD country, one percentage increase in welfare spending rate 
leads to a reduction of working hours by about five hours in one year. Interestingly, 
Welfare spending on other social services as percentage of GDP (otherwelf) has 
significant positive effect on working hours. This may imply that although three biggest 
parts of welfare expenditure and total welfare spending provide disincentive to working, 
overall, welfare spending on other public social services provide incentive to working. 
Different patterns of time allocation between working and leisure lead to different life 
paces. The life pace is presumably closely related to the probability of traffic accidents. 
As the second step of the test on my hypothesis of the relationship between road fatality 
rate and welfare level, a simple fixed effect model of road fatality rate on hours is run, the 
estimate shown in table 4 is 0.0576, indicating that on average, one more extra working 
hour increases the road fatality rate (per million people) by about 0.06. Consequently, 
when a simple FE regression of road fatality on total welfare spending rate is run, welfare 
expenditure has a strongly significant estimate -2.01, implying that one percentage point 
increase in welfare spending relative to GDP is translated into a drop of road fatality 
incidence by 2.01 (per million inhabitants). As the table 2 shows, similar relationships 
can be found for other welfare variables (income_support, pension_exp, health_exp) but 
not for otherwelf. 
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Because road has no significant correlation with otherwelf, another instrument variable 
has to be found for this welfare measure. I choose proportion of seats held by women in 
national parliaments (women) to instrument spending rate of other social services. The 
justification of this IV is the ratio of welfare expenditure on various public social services 
to GDP is presumably related to the importance an average voter of a nation attaches to 
wealth equality or income equality. A country emphasizing income equality presumably 
also stresses on other aspect of equality, such as gender equality. In this sense, the 
variable women measuring gender equality can also represent national attitude towards 
other forms of equality, such as economic equality, which directly affects welfare 
expenditure. 
The overall IV relevance test is performed by running a Least Squares Dummy Variable 
Regression (LSDV) of a welfare variable on the IV (road or women) and six exogenous 
control variables, i.e., all variables in itx  of (1). The table 5 indicates that the IV road is a 
strong IV for income-support, pension_exp and public_social according to Sotck and 
Yogo (2005)’s thumb rule of F value exceeding 10 for one endogenous variable. It is a 
very weak IV for health_exp (F statistic 3.59 p value 0.0589).  The IV women is also 
relatively weak for otherwelf although the F statistic is 8. Since health_exp has no valid 
instrument, it is assumed to be exogenous and will not be subject to endogeneity (DWH) 
test. 
The Durbin–Wu–Hausman (DWH) test can be performed as follows: we first regress a 
welfare measure on all the explanatory variables in itx of (1) (long_real_r, labor_prodg, 
trade_open, popd, inflation and dtot ), an instrument variable for welfare (road /women), 
dummy variables for each country  and dummy variables for each year and obtain the 
residual, 2
^
v . Then we simply include 2
^
v  along with unity, all the variables in itx  and itw  
of (1) and dummy variables for nations and years in an OLS regression of one 
unemployment indicator (unemp/long_unem2/youth_unem2) and obtain the t statistic 
on 2
^
v . The p values for the estimated parameters of  2
^
v  for all welfare measures but 
health_exp are presented in table 5. We can only find evidence of endogeneity for 
income_support for total unemployment rate (unemp) at 5 percent significance level 
against a two-sided alternative, so 2SLS estimation is only necessary for income_support 
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in the regression for unemp to ensure consistency of the estimate of income_support.  
The DWH statistic of public_social is also marginally significant at 10% level (p 
value=0.0824) for unemp. Since this p value indicates a very weak endogeneity, both IV 
and OLS regressions will be run and results will be compared. A LSDV approach will be 
adopted for estimation of the final models for three unemployment rates. Among the 
regressions, that with dependent variable unemp and independent variable 
income_support will be a 2SLS regression with an IV road. 
 
IV.II Test Persistence of Unemployment Rate: a Dynamic Version of the Baseline 
Model 
As Bernal-Verdugo et. al. point out, it is important to note there is high persistence of 
unemployment rates. According to their estimation results, a one percentage point 
increase in previous unemployment translates into a 0.83 percentage point higher 
unemployment in the current period, which can be dubbed as a “momentum” effect of 
pre-existing unemployment rate levels. OECD (2006) also indicates that a 
macroeconomic shock might not only raise current unemployment but, in addition, its 
effects might persist over time. In order to assess initial versus persistence effects of 
shocks, a dynamic version of the baseline model (1) is needed. 
Generally, for a dynamic FE model: 
ititiitit ucyzy +++= −1,1ργ                                                                                             (2) 
To test persistence (state dependence), first-differencing equation (2) gives: 
ittiitit uyzy ∆+∆+∆=∆ −1,1ργ                                                                                 (3) 
Following Wooldrige (2001, pp. 299), to test for state dependence in total unemployment 
rate, after allowing for unobserved country effects, the model is applying an IV  
regression to equation (3) with ity being unemp but without any other explanatory 
variables itz∆ , where 3,2,
,
−− titi yy  are used to instrument 1, −
∆ tiy . Further, to correct for 
possible serial correlation in itu∆ , I use standard error robust to arbitrary form of 
heteroskedasticity or serial correlation (Wooldrige (2001, p275).  
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The F statistic for joint significance of 3,2, , −− titi yy  in the first stage regression for 
1, −∆ tiy yields p-value of 0, indicating they are strong instruments. The 2SLS estimation of 
the first-differenced equation (3) without  it
z∆
 gives an estimate of the coefficient of 
1, −∆ tiy  of 0.3358, which has a robust standard error 0.064 and p value 0, indicating that 
overall, there is strong state dependence for unemp, similar results are found for long 
unemployment rate and youth unemployment rate. Therefore we do need to put the lag of 
response variable of unemployment rate as a regressor and to extend the econometric 
model to dynamic specification for our data as shown below.  
itiitittitit ucwxyy +++++= − δγθ1            t=1,2,…,T                                             (4) 
Consequently, the estimation method will change from pure LSDV to LSDV+IV with IV 
being two-period and three-period lagged values of the response variable (for the 
regression of unemp on income_support, additional IV of road is needed). 
 
V. THE RESULTS 
The main results regarding the relationship between unemployment and welfare measures 
are shown in Table 6- table 8, which display the estimates for the dynamic specification 
of the econometric model (4). First and foremost, it should be noted that, in the 
regressions for all three unemployment rates, we find that three welfare measures have a 
statistically significant positive effect: spending rates of income support, pension benefit 
and total welfare. Specifically, increasing the total welfare spending rate (public_social) 
by one standard deviation increases, on average, the total unemployment rate by about 
1.06 percentage points (0.1675*6.3510).  Interestingly, for all three unemployment rates, 
the estimates of income_support and pension_exp both have higher magnitudes than that 
of public_social. In other words, the magnitudes of the estimates of two sub-components 
of total welfare spending are larger than that of total welfare expenditure.  This implies 
that some other sub-components of total welfare spending, which are captured by 
otherwelf or health_exp may have negative effects on unemployment, which in turn 
offset part of the impacts from income support and pension expenditure on 
unemployment. So the net impact of these negative effects from unidentified sub-
components of total welfare spending (for example welfare on public education) and 
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positive effects from income support and pension is statistically and significantly positive 
but has a lower magnitude than that of either income support or pension. For total 
unemployment rate, since public health expenditure has a marginally significant estimate 
(which is in conflict with Beraldo et. al.(2009)’s finding that public health expenditure 
has significantly positive effect on economic growth), it can be sure that negative effects 
come from other social services, which have only quantitative impacts but not qualitative 
impacts on unemployment rate. In other words, some sub-components in other social 
welfare services can only affect the magnitude of the estimate of total welfare spending 
rate but not the direction. Overall, one percentage point increase in the spending rate of 
total welfare is associated with a 0.17 percentage point increase in the unemployment 
rate.  
The DWH test result for total welfare spending rate (public_social) in table 4 indicates 
that the DWH statistic has a p value of 0.0824. If we take significance level at 5%, it is 
exogenous, if 10% endogenous. The last column in table 5 also shows the IV estimate of 
public_social when it is taken as an endogenous variable and road is used as an IV (in 
addition to two lagged values of unemployment rate as IVs). The estimate’s magnitude 
becomes much larger but has the same sign in this case. 
We then turn to the result for the next unemployment measure: long-term unemployment 
rate, which is the proportion of people who have been unemployed for 12 months or more 
among all unemployed. It is a measure that can better represent the impacts of institutions 
and policies other than cyclical shock on unemployment as it has less influence from 
short-term fluctuation of aggregate demand. As OECD Factbook 2011 points out, “Long-
term unemployment is of particular concern to the people affected and to policy makers. 
Quite apart from the mental stress caused to the unemployed and their families, high rates 
of long-term unemployment indicate that labour markets are operating inefficiently. In 
countries that pay generous unemployment benefits, the existence of long-term 
unemployment is also a significant burden on government finances”. The standard total 
unemployment rate measures short-term fluctuation of unemployment level while long-
term unemployment rate reflects duration structure of unemployment. 
The impact of welfare expenditure on long-term unemployment rate shows similar 
regularity as that for standard total unemployment rate. One standard deviation increase 
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in total welfare spending rate increases long unemployment rate by 3.895 
(0.6133*6.3510) percentage points. The impacts from income support and pension 
expenditure are even higher, ranging from 6.09 to 11.29 percentage points for one 
standard deviation increase. These substantial effects demonstrate that the impact of 
welfare state on unemployment is not only caused by business cycle shock, it is a 
structural problem with fundamental institutional and policy causes. No matter how 
supporters of welfare state claim that entitlement society is neutral to economic 
performance, the real data clearly shows that the scale of welfare programs is positively 
correlated with unemployment, in both short and long terms, in both level and in duration 
structure. 
The results for youth unemployment rate in table 8 further reinforce the above 
conclusion. Every percentage point increase in total welfare spending rate is associated 
with 0.25 percentage point increase in youth unemployment rate. Equivalently, one 
standard deviation increase in total welfare spending rate increases youth unemployment 
rate by 4.789 (0.2469*6.3510) percentage points. The youth unemployment rate is 
unemployed youth as percentage of youth labor force between 15 and 24 year old. It 
represents age structure of unemployment. This estimate (0.2469) is higher than that for 
total unemployment rate (0.1675), suggesting that policy effect of welfare programs is 
higher for young people than for adults workers. 
Among the control variables, we find that trade openness has significant negative effects 
and population density has positive effects on total unemployment rate and youth 
unemployment rate. The former conforms to the findings of Bernal-Verdugo et. al.(2012) 
and  Felbermayr et. al. (2009). The latter is consistent with intuition. It is interesting to 
compare two neighboring countries with striking difference in population density: 
Canada and USA. During the three decades between 1980 and 2010, the average 
population density is 3.22 and 29.12 for Canada and US respectively. If everything else 
were equal, the average unemployment rate of the US during this period should be much 
higher than that of Canada based on our significant estimates of popd. However, the fact 
is the real average unemployment of US during this period is 6.3% while that of Canada 
is 8.6%. Of course there are many reasons for this difference. According to our 
estimation results in table 6, welfare spending rate plays an important role. The real data 
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supports our derivation: the average total welfare spending rate during this period is 
17.5% and 14.97% for Canada and USA respectively. If the United States takes on the 
road of European welfare states, the US unemployment rate would definitely rise, so does 
long-term unemployment rate and youth unemployment. 
 
To further explore the mechanism of the effect of welfare spending, a hypothesis is 
proposed that one mechanism through which welfare spending impacts on unemployment 
is decreasing investment because tax on the income from capital reduces the incentive to 
save for businesses. Investment rate is vital to growth and employment. The results in 
table 9 test and validate this hypothesis.  The control variables include inflation, long real 
interest rate and trade openness. The FE estimates for five welfare measures give strong 
evidence to support the hypothesis: one percentage increase in total welfare spending rate 
is associated with about 0.29 percentage point decrease in investment rate.  Similar to the 
effects on unemployment rate, only income support, health expenditure and total welfare 
spending have significant impacts. The fact that the estimate of the last is higher than the 
former two variables implies that some other components of public social expenditure 
may have positive effects on investment that counteract the impact of pension and 
income support to some extent.  Through the negative effect on investment, welfare 
spending can affect both employment and economic growth. The latter effect is supported 
by Ding (2012)’s econometric study. 
 
VI. THE ROBUSTNESS CHECK AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
To check the robustness of our estimation results to specification change, I re-run the 
model (4) with two control variables changed and one control variable added:  labor 
productivity growth replaced by multi factor productivity growth rate and terms of trade 
shock by the lagged value of terms of trade change. The added control variable is net 
migration rate, which is defined as the difference between immigration into and 
emigration from the country during the year per 1 000 inhabitants.  
The motivation of adding this explanatory variable is derived from the significant 
estimates of pension spending rate (pension_exp) shown in table 6. Since pension benefit 
expenditure is shown to be one of two parts of welfare spending that hinder employment, 
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the immediate employment-promoting policy implication is either lowering social 
security tax rate or raising full retirement age (equivalently, increasing the contribution 
period needed to qualify for full pensions) or reducing proportion of retirees in the 
population. Lowering social security tax implies benefit cut, which inevitably will 
encounter fierce resistance from senior voters. Raising retirement age is also unpopular. 
As shown before, people in generous welfare states tend to work less time due to 
disincentive effect of welfare benefits (see the first panel of table 4). Increasing lifetime 
working time by raising social security eligibility age will also be most likely to bring 
about strong political opposition. The most hopeful solution then goes to the last option: 
reducing proportion of retirees in the population by introducing more working-age 
immigrants.  Admitting working-age immigrants, particularly those with high skills is 
hypothesized to be able to deter the trend of ageing of population, to decrease pension 
benefit expenditure as a percentage of GDP and thus to facilitate economic growth and 
employment.  
This hypothesis is tested by adding net migration rate (migrate) to model (4) with the 
above-mentioned changed and added control variables. The results corresponding to table 
6 are presented in table 10 (DWH test shows that income_support is not endogenous in 
this specification). 
The estimates for the welfare variables are quite close to those in table 6 except that of 
income_support. Because of not using IV road, the estimate of income_support has 
higher efficiency and lower magnitude but no qualitative change. As in the case of table 
6, the significant estimates of income_support and pension_exp have higher magnitudes 
than that of public_social. The estimates of migrate are strongly significant in all cases. 
One percentage point increase in net migration rate translates into 0.09 percentage point 
increase in total unemployment rate. Equivalently, one standard deviation increase in net 
migration rate yields a 0.4 (0.0899*4.4158) percentage point increase in unemployment 
rate, supporting our hypothesis on the impact of immigration on unemployment. This 
econometric test refutes the claim widely seen in press that immigrants snatch job 
opportunity from native workers. The data tells us the opposite thing: immigrants are 
decreasing unemployment rate by contributing to pension system and bringing in talents 
and technology. This finding is consistent with Muysken and Ziesemer (2011)’s 
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conclusion that immigration can help to alleviate the burden ageing presents for the 
welfare states of most Western Economies. 
As the final robustness check for the economic impact of welfare state, a more general 
measure for welfare state or entitlement society is used to replace welfare measures, that 
is, the total government expenditure as a percentage of GDP (govexp), which indicates 
the size of government and reflects historical and current political decisions about its role 
in providing services and in redistributing income. Government expenditure, which 
includes welfare expenditure, of course contains some items that have positive externality 
and thus are productive investment that promote growth and employment, as mentioned 
in section III, but what is the overall net effect of various sub-components of government 
expenditure? The last column of table 10 gives us an answer: The estimate of govexp 
indicates that every percentage point increase in total government expenditure as a share 
of GDP can increase total unemployment rate by 0.37 percentage point. This strongly 
significant estimate is consistent with that of total welfare spending rate and also 
consistent with Tullio (1987)’s finding that “the tax-financed growth in government 
expenditure which has occurred in the last 20-25 years has caused unemployment and 
slowed down the rate of economic growth during the period.” and Grier and Tullock 
(1989)’s finding that the growth of government consumption is significantly negatively 
correlated with the economic growth. The estimates of welfare expenditure rate and 
government spending rate undoubtedly have profound policy implication for the decision 
makers in Western Economies, particularly in face of European Sovereign Debt Crisis 
and American Deficit Crisis. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on the economic effect of welfare state 
in three respects. First, while almost all of previous studies have mostly focused on public 
expenditures in health and education or total welfare spending on GDP growth rate, this 
paper focus the impacts of four biggest components of welfare expenditure on three 
unemployment measures: total unemployment rate, long-term unemployment rate and 
youth unemployment rate. Second, this paper formally tests potential endogeneity of the 
variable of interest: welfare variable by using Durbin–Wu–Hausman test to ensure 
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estimation unbiasedness and consistency. Third, this paper identifies two sources of 
negative effect of welfare spending: income support and pension benefit. So the effect of 
welfare state or entitlement society is analyzed at both sub-component and aggregate 
level. Third, this paper econometrically tests the hypothesis that one channel through 
which welfare spending impacts employment is investment rate. 
The findings in this paper indicate that, after controlling for other macroeconomic and 
demographic variables, an increase in the total welfare spending rate (relative to GDP) 
has a statistically significant positive impact on unemployment outcomes (i.e., total, 
youth, and long-term unemployment). Among the four components of total welfare 
expenditure analyzed, only income support and pension benefit are found to have 
significant effect on all unemployment outcomes (public expenditure on health services 
has marginally significant positive effect on total unemployment rate, but not on long-
term unemployment rate and youth unemployment rate) and their impacts have larger 
magnitudes than that of total welfare spending, implying that some unidentified sub-
components in other public social services (probably welfare expenditure on public 
education) have negative impacts on unemployment, which offset the impacts from 
income support and pension expenditure to some extent.  
Besides the finding that entitlement society with high welfare expenditure necessarily 
accompanies high unemployment, the econometric estimation results of the paper also 
provide evidence to support the hypothesis that one channel through which welfare 
expenditure impacts unemployment is investment rate. Through the negative effect on 
investment, welfare spending can affect both employment and economic growth.  
The finding also suggests that contrary to the claim widely seen in press that immigrants 
snatch job opportunity from native workers, immigration can decrease a nation’s 
unemployment rate. Combining this with the finding that total government expenditure as 
a share of GDP has a significantly positive impact on unemployment rate, as total welfare 
spending rate does, Overall the results of this paper suggest that policies that cut welfare 
expenditures on income support and pension benefits should reduce unemployment. 
Another way of facilitating employment is introducing more working-age immigrants, 
particularly skillful immigrants, which is a feasible way to deter population ageing and 
soaring pension spending rate and decreasing unemployment rate. 
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Table 1 The variable definitions, data sources and time coverage of data 
variable Definition Data source Time coverage 
dtot Percentage change in the terms of trade weighted by the 
trade openness of the country 
WDI2010 
1981 - 2010 
govexp Government expenditure as % of GDP  1960 - 2010 
health_exp Public social expenditures on Health as a percentage of GDP SOCX 1980 - 2007 
hours Average hours actually worked: 
Hours per year per person in employment 
OECD Factbook 2010 
1980 - 2012 
income_support Public social expenditures on income support to the working-
age population as % GDP 
SOCX 
1955 - 2010 
inflation Inflation rate: Consumer price indices (CPI): annual growth in 
percentage 
OECD Factbook 2010 
1955 - 2008 
invrate Investment rate: the share of total GDP that is devoted to 
investment in fixed assets 
OECD Factbook 2010 
1976 - 2006 
Labor_prodg Labor productivity growth rate OECD StatExtracts 1990 - 2011 
Long_real_r long real interest rate :The nominal returns on long-term 
government bond minus the actual inflation rate over the 
following year 
 
1955 - 2008 
Long_unem2 Long unemployment rate: proportion of people who have 
been unemployed for 12 months or more among all 
unemployed 
WDI2010 
1980 - 2010 
mf_prodg Multi-factor Productivity growth OECD StatExtract 1985 - 2010 
migrate Net migration rate: The difference between immigration into 
and emigration from the area during the year per 1 000 
inhabitants 
OECD Factbook 2010 
1955 - 2008 
otherwelf Welfare spending on other social services as percentage of 
GDP 
SOCX 
1955 - 2010 
pension_exp Public social expenditures on pension as % GDP SOCX 1980 - 2010 
popd Population density (people per square km of land area) WDI2010 1961 - 2010 
public_social Public Social Expenditure as percentage of GDP SOCX 1980 - 2010 
road Road fatalities Per million inhabitants OECD Factbook 2010 1990 - 2008 
Trade_open International trade openness (% of GDP) WDI2010 1960 - 2008 
unemp Unemployment rate OECD Factbook 1955 - 2010 
women Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments 
(%) 
WDI2010 
1990 - 2011 
Youth_unem2 Youth unemployment rate: % of youth labour force (15-24) WDI2010 1980 - 2010 




Table 2 Summary Statistics for variables used in the models 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
unemp 989 6.5237 3.7334 0.1 20.1494 
long_unem2 817 32.4050 17.8792 0.3 76.2000 
youth_unem2 889 15.5267 8.2267 2.6 43.9 
income_support 971 4.6195 2.4429 0 13.4 
pension_exp 954 6.8259 3.0288 0.2 14.1 
health_exp 967 5.3930 1.4556 0.7 9.4 
otherwelf 923 2.5674 1.9509 0 10.3 
public_social 951 19.3968 6.3510 1.7 35.7 
labor_prodg 694 1.9347 2.4922 -11.6 17.5 
mf_prodg 456 1.2140 1.7142 -7.6 7.6 
dtot 688 0.0198 1.8160 -10.2448 22.5451 
inflation 1513 12.1580 47.3427 -3.5 1281.4 
trade_open 1187 34.8219 21.5213 4 160.5 
popd 1622 115.4203 113.2750 1.3646 508.8568 
invrate 1193 22.8427 4.1450 14.8 37.5 
migrate 1512 1.6707 4.4158 -23.1 40.3 
road 637 115.2418 46.6745 37 316 
 
 
Table 3 Correlation Matrix of Unemployment Rates and Welfare Measures 
 
unemp long_unem2 youth_unem2 income pension health otherwelf welfare 
unemp 1 
       
long_unem2 0.5777*** 1 
      
youth_unem2 0.8824*** 0.5782*** 1 
     
income 0.1821*** 0.1830*** 0.0910*** 1 
    
pension 0.3217*** 0.5505*** 0.4131*** 0.2514*** 1 
   
health 0.0657* 0.1006*** 0.0033 0.4109*** 0.5179*** 1 
  
otherwelf -0.0433  -0.2491***  -0.1112*** 0.5205*** -0.0161 0.4019*** 1 
 
welfare 0.2259*** 0.2911*** 0.1933*** 0.7681*** 0.7054*** 0.7739*** 0.6097*** 1 
Note: income=income_support; pension=pension_exp; health=health_exp; welfare=public_social. 
*,**,*** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. 
 
Table 4  The relationships between working hours, road fatality and welfare variables 
Dependent 
variable 
Independent variable coefficient Standard 
Error 
P value for 
SE 
R-square N 
hours Public_social -4.4143 1.1136 0.0000 0.96 698 
 Income_support -4.0495 1.8387 0.028 0.95 710 
 Pension_exp -9.7614 2.3246 0.000 0.96 693 
 Health_exp -22.8939 3.6359 0.000 0.95 706 
 otherwelf 13.1506 4.0490 0.0012 0.96 673 
road hours 0.0576 0.0176 0.001 0.88 574 
 Public_social -2.0141 0.4415 0.0000 0.89 564 
 Income_support -2.6313 0.8069 0.001 0.88 575 
 Pension_exp -2.8680 0.9061 0.002 0.88 564 
 Health_exp -5.3748 1.5245 0.000 0.88 572 
 otherwelf -0.3952 1.8835 0.834 0.88 546 
Note: All the regressions include both time and country fixed effects. 
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Table 5 The results of IV strength test & DWH endogeneity test 
Response 
variable 
statistic Income_support Pension_exp Health_exp Otherwelf Public_social 
unemp IV strength F 
statistic 
9.92 (0.0018) 16.73 (0.0001) 3.59 (0.0589) 8.00 (0.0051) 11.16(0.0009) 
 DWH statistic 3.92 (0.0486)** 0.94 (0.3337)  0.87 (0.3530) 3.03 (0.0824)* 
Long_unem
2 
DWH statistic 2.13 (0.1452) 0.22 (0.6396)  0.43 (0.5124) 1.43 (0.2322) 
Youth_une
m2 
DWH statistic 1.03 (0.3109) 0.02 (0.8851)  0.44 (0.5095) 0.72 (0.3982) 
Note: The IV of otherwelf is women, that of other variables is road. 
IV strength test is a regression of one welfare measure on the column header (one of income_support, pension_exp, health_exp, 
otherwelf and public_social) on long_real_r, labor_prodg, trade_open, popd, inflation and dtot , IV (road /women), dummy variables 
for each country  and dummy variables for each year . 
DWH endogeneity test is a regression of one unemployment measure (one of unemp, long_unem2, youth_unem2) on one welfare 
measure(one of income_support, pension_exp, health_exp, otherwelf and public_social), long_real_r, labor_prodg, trade_open, popd, 
inflation, dtot , dummy variables for each country , dummy variables for each year and the residual from the IV strength test. 




Table 6 The results of Final Models for Total Unemployment Rate 
 unemp unemp unemp unemp unemp unemp 
Income_support 0.9534 
(0.3784)** 
     
Pension_exp  0.4429 
(0.1078)*** 
    
Health_exp   0.3109 (0.1794)*    
otherwelf    0.0038 
(0.1902) 
  




One year lagged 

























































Additional IV road     road 
R square 0.9589 0.9674 0.9659 0.9649 0.9678 0.9513 
N 375 375 375 375 375 375 
Note: Robust clustered standard errors in parenthesis. *,**,*** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent, 
respectively. All the regressions are IV regressions with two IVs to instrument the lagged value of response variable: two-year and 
three-year lagged values of the response variable, additional IV is specified in the table. All the regressions include fixed effects of 




Table 7 The results of Final Models for Long Unemployment Rate 
 Long_unem2 Long_unem2 Long_unem2 Long_unem2 Long_unem2 
Income_support 1.3179 
(0.4043)*** 
    
Pension_exp  1.6545 
(0.2604)*** 
   
Health_exp   0.8738 (0.6302)   
otherwelf    -0.2256 
(0.4736) 
 
Public_social     0.6133 
(0.1540)*** 
One year lagged 











Labor_prodg 0.1882 (0.1113)* 0.3407 
(0.0934)*** 




































R square 0.9765 0.9776 0.9755 0.9752 0.9768 
N 353 353 353 353 353 
Note: T-statistics based on robust clustered standard errors in parenthesis. *,**,*** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 
percent, respectively. All the regressions are IV regressions with two IVs to instrument the lagged value of response variable: two-





Table 8 The results of Final Models for Youth Unemployment Rate 
 youth_unem2 Youth_unem2 Youth_unem2 Youth_unem2 Youth_unem2 
Income_support 0.5665 
(0.1640)*** 
    
Pension_exp  0.6545 
(0.1952)*** 
   
Health_exp   0.6105 (0.3803)   
otherwelf    -0.2054 
(0.4467) 
 
Public_social     0.2469 
(0.0725)*** 
















































R square 0.9647 0.9641 0.9639 0.9632 0.9643 
N 375 375 375 375 375 
Note: T-statistics based on robust clustered standard errors in parenthesis. *,**,*** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 
percent, respectively. All the regressions are IV regressions with two IVs to instrument the lagged value of response variable: two-
year and three-year lagged values of the response variable. All the regressions include fixed effects of both year and country. 
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Table 9 The results of Final Models for Investment Rate 
 invrate invrate invrate invrate invrate 
Income_support -0.4790 (0.2269)**     
Pension_exp  -0.7908 (0.3080)**    
Health_exp   -0.2697 (0.4739)   
otherwelf    -0.3081 
(0.4781) 
 
Public_social     -0.2854 
(0.1259)** 












R square 0.6930  0.7059 0.6836 0.6841 0.6997 
N 564 562 562 562 562 
Note: T-statistics based on robust clustered standard errors in parenthesis. *,**,*** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 
percent, respectively. All the regressions include fixed effects of both year and country. 
 
 
Table 10  Sensitivity analysis 
 unemp unemp unemp unemp unemp unemp 
Income_support 0.3962 
(0.1162)*** 
     
Pension_exp  0.4343 
(0.0989)*** 
    
Health_exp   0.2815 (0.1961)    
otherwelf    0.1744 
(0.1925) 
  
Public_social     0.1818 
(0.0523)*** 
 
govexp      0.3714 
(0.1016)*** 
One year lagged 











































































R square 0.9686 0.9666 0.9645 0.9632 0.9681 0.9669 
N 311 311 311 311 311 279 
Note: T-statistics based on robust clustered standard errors in parenthesis. *,**,*** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 
percent, respectively. All the regressions are IV regressions with two IVs to instrument the lagged value of response variable: two-
year and three-year lagged values of the response variable. All the regressions include fixed effects of both year and country. 
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STATA program for the paper “Unemployment and Welfare State: What do 
the Data Tell Us?” 
 
Author: Hong Ding 
 
insheet using "C:\data\personal\paper\welfare_growth_dummy_final.csv ", 
comma 
 
xtset id year1 
 
sort id year1 
 
drop ltot dtot ldtot dtot2 lprodg lunemp l2unem l3unem  
by id: gen ltot=l.terms_of_trade 
 
 by id: gen dtot=(log(terms_of_trade)-log(ltot))*trade_open 
 
by id: gen ldtot=l.dtot 
 
by id: gen dtot2=( terms_of_trade-ltot)/ltot 
 
by id: gen lprodg=l.prodg 
 
by id: gen lunemp=l.unemp 
 
by id: gen l2unem=l2.unemp 
by id: gen l3unem=l3.unemp 
 
 
****The following derived variables are already in the dataset************** 
 
by id: gen dunem=d.unemp 
by id: gen ldunem=l.dunem 
 
by id: gen llabor_prodg=l.labor_prodg 
by id: gen lmf_prodg=l.mf_prodg 
by id: gen lead_inflation=inflation[_n+1] 
 
by id: gen long_real_r=long_r-lead_inflation 
 
by id: gen l_lunem=l.long_unem2 
 
by id: gen l2_lunem=l2.long_unem2 
by id: gen l3_lunem=l3.long_unem2 
by id: gen d_lunem=d.long_unem2 
by id: gen l_d_lunem=l.d_lunem 
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by id: gen lnopen=log(trade_open) 
by id: gen lnpopd=log(popd) 
 
 
by id: gen l_yunem=l.youth_unem2 
 
by id: gen l2_yunem=l2.youth_unem2 
by id: gen l3_yunem=l3.youth_unem2 
 
by id: gen d_yunem=d.youth_unem2 
by id: gen l_d_yunem=l.d_yunem 
 
 
IV relevance and strength test: 
 
quietly reg      income_support road long_real_r  labor_prodg dtot inflation trade_open 
popd i.id i.year1 
 
. test road 
 
  
 ( 1)  road = 0 
 
       F(  1,   334) =    9.92 
            Prob > F =    0.0018 
 
 
quietly reg      pension_exp road long_real_r  labor_prodg dtot inflation  trade_open 
popd i.id i.year1 
 
. test road 
 
( 1)  road = 0 
 
       F(  1,   334) =   16.73 
            Prob > F =    0.0001 
 
quietly reg    health_exp  road long_real_r  labor_prodg dtot inflation trade_open popd 
i.id i.year1 
 
. test road 
 
 ( 1)  road = 0 
 
       F(  1,   334) =    3.59 
            Prob > F =    0.0589 
 
quietly reg    otherwelf  women long_real_r  labor_prodg dtot inflation trade_open popd 
i.id i.year1 
 
. test women 
 
( 1)  women = 0 
 
       F(  1,   227) =    8.00 
            Prob > F =    0.0051 
 




 F(  1,   334) =   11.16 
            Prob > F =    0.0009 
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DWH (Durbin-Wu-Hausman Endogeneity ) test: 
quietly reg      income_support  road long_real_r  labor_prodg dtot inflation trade_open 
popd i.id i.year1 
 
predict res1, res 
 
quietly reg  unemp income_support labor_prodg dtot inflation long_real_r trade_open popd 




 ( 1)  res1 = 0 
 
       F(  1,   330) =    3.92 
            Prob > F =    0.0486 
 
quietly reg      pension_exp road long_real_r  labor_prodg dtot inflation trade_open popd 
i.id i.year1 
 
predict res2, res 
 
quietly reg  unemp pension_exp labor_prodg dtot inflation long_real_r trade_open popd 
res2 i.id i.year 
test res2 
 
( 1)  res2 = 0 
 
       F(  1,   330) =    0.94 
            Prob > F =    0.3337 
 
quietly reg    otherwelf  women long_real_r  labor_prodg dtot inflation trade_open popd 
i.id i.year1 
 
predict res3, res 
 





 ( 1)  res3 = 0 
 
       F(  1,   225) =    0.87 
            Prob > F =    0.3530 
 
 
quietly reg    public_social  road long_real_r  labor_prodg dtot inflation trade_open 
popd i.id i.year1 
predict res4, res 
 
quietly reg  unemp public_social labor_prodg dtot inflation long_real_r trade_open popd  




. test res4 
 
 ( 1)  res4 = 0 
 
       F(  1,   330) =    3.03 





ivregress 2sls  dunem ( ldunem= l2unem  l3unem), robust cluster(id) 
 
ivregress 2sls  dunem ( ldunem= l2unem  l3unem), robust cluster(id) 
 
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression               Number of obs =     884 
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                                                       Wald chi2(1)  =   27.19 
                                                       Prob > chi2   =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1661 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .98324 
 
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 33 clusters in id) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       dunem |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      ldunem |   .3358136   .0644064     5.21   0.000     .2095793    .4620478 
       _cons |   .0725361   .0127061     5.71   0.000     .0476327    .0974396 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instrumented:  ldunem 
Instruments:   l2unem l3unem 
 
 
ivregress 2sls  dunem (  ldunem= l2unem  l3unem) if year1==2008 
 
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression               Number of obs =      30 
                                                       Wald chi2(1)  =   16.13 
                                                       Prob > chi2   =  0.0001 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.4373 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .70779 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       dunem |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      ldunem |   .6689215   .1665613     4.02   0.000     .3424673    .9953757 
       _cons |   .3530412   .1665505     2.12   0.034     .0266083    .6794741 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instrumented:  ldunem 
Instruments:   l2unem l3unem 
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Long-term unemployment rate: 
 
 
ivregress 2sls  d_lunem (l_d_lunem = l2_lunem  l3_lunem), robust cluster(id) 
 
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression               Number of obs =     691 
                                                       Wald chi2(1)  =   30.66 
                                                       Prob > chi2   =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =       . 
                                                       Root MSE      =  6.2274 
 
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 34 clusters in id) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
     d_lunem |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   l_d_lunem |   .8912324    .160957     5.54   0.000     .5757625    1.206702 
       _cons |   .1612354   .0437622     3.68   0.000     .0754631    .2470077 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
DWH test: 
quietly reg      income_support  road long_real_r  labor_prodg dtot inflation trade_open 
popd  i.id i.year1 
 
predict res1, res 
 
quietly reg  long_unem2 income_support labor_prodg dtot inflation long_real_r trade_open 






quietly reg      pension_exp road long_real_r  labor_prodg dtot inflation trade_open popd 
i.id i.year1 
 
predict res2, res 
 
quietly reg  long_unem2 pension_exp labor_prodg dtot inflation long_real_r trade_open 




quietly reg    otherwelf  women long_real_r  labor_prodg dtot inflation trade_open popd 
i.id i.year1 
predict res3, res 
 
quietly reg  long_unem2 otherwelf labor_prodg dtot inflation long_real_r trade_open popd 




quietly reg    public_social  road long_real_r  labor_prodg dtot inflation trade_open 
popd i.id i.year1 
predict res4, res 
 
quietly reg  long_unem2 public_social labor_prodg dtot inflation long_real_r trade_open 







( 1)  res1 = 0 
 
       F(  1,   320) =    2.13 
            Prob > F =    0.1452 
( 1)  res2 = 0 
 
       F(  1,   320) =    0.22 
            Prob > F =    0.6396 
 
 ( 1)  res3 = 0 
 
       F(  1,   218) =    0.43 
            Prob > F =    0.5124 
( 1)  res4 = 0 
 
       F(  1,   320) =    1.43 
            Prob > F =    0.2322
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Youth unemployment rate: 
 
 
ivregress 2sls  d_yunem (l_d_yunem = l2_yunem  l3_yunem), robust cluster(id) 
 
quietly reg      income_support  road long_real_r  labor_prodg dtot inflation trade_open 
popd  i.id i.year1 
 
predict res1, res 
 
quietly reg  youth_unem2 income_support labor_prodg dtot inflation long_real_r trade_open 




quietly reg      pension_exp road long_real_r  labor_prodg dtot inflation trade_open popd 
i.id i.year1 
 
predict res2, res 
 
quietly reg  youth_unem2 pension_exp labor_prodg dtot inflation long_real_r trade_open 
popd res2 i.id i.year 
 
test res2 
quietly reg    otherwelf  women long_real_r  labor_prodg dtot inflation trade_open popd 
i.id i.year1 
predict res3, res 
 
quietly reg  youth_unem2 otherwelf labor_prodg dtot inflation long_real_r trade_open popd 
res3 i.id i.year 
test res3 
 
quietly reg    public_social  road long_real_r  labor_prodg dtot inflation trade_open 
popd i.id i.year1 
predict res4, res 
 
quietly reg  youth_unem2 public_social labor_prodg dtot inflation long_real_r trade_open 




. ivregress 2sls  d_yunem (l_d_yunem = l2_yunem  l3_yunem), robust cluster(id) 
 
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression               Number of obs =     777 
                                                       Wald chi2(1)  =   16.91 
                                                       Prob > chi2   =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1220 
                                                       Root MSE      =  2.2623 
 
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 34 clusters in id) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
     d_yunem |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   l_d_yunem |   .3155185   .0767332     4.11   0.000     .1651242    .4659127 
       _cons |   .0923983   .0368169     2.51   0.012     .0202384    .1645582 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
( 1)  res1 = 0 
 
       F(  1,   332) =    1.03 
            Prob > F =    0.3109 
 
 ( 1)  res2 = 0 
 
       F(  1,   332) =    0.02 
            Prob > F =    0.8851 
 
( 1)  res3 = 0 
 
       F(  1,   226) =    0.44 
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            Prob > F =    0.5095 
 
  
 ( 1)  res4 = 0 
 
       F(  1,   332) =    0.72 













ivregress 2sls unemp (lunemp income_support=l2unem l3unem road) labor_prodg dtot 
inflation long_real_r trade_open popd i.id i.year, robust cluster(id) 
 
 
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression               Number of obs =     375 
                                                       Wald chi2(50) =98928.53 
                                                       Prob > chi2   =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.9589 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .76153 
 
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 26 clusters in id) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       unemp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      lunemp |   .7741542   .0702166    11.03   0.000     .6365321    .9117763 
income_sup~t |   .9534025   .3783636     2.52   0.012     .2118234    1.694982 
 labor_prodg |   .0011427   .0495645     0.02   0.982    -.0960019    .0982872 
        dtot |   .0055463   .0593049     0.09   0.925    -.1106891    .1217817 
   inflation |   .0120777     .03084     0.39   0.695    -.0483675    .0725229 
 long_real_r |   .0270026   .0434166     0.62   0.534    -.0580924    .1120975 
  trade_open |   -.025014    .031729    -0.79   0.430    -.0872018    .0371738 
        popd |   .0874734   .0488652     1.79   0.073    -.0083007    .1832475 
 
 
ivregress 2sls unemp (lunemp =l2unem l3unem) pension_exp labor_prodg dtot inflation 




Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression               Number of obs =     375 
                                                       Wald chi2(50) = 2677.55 
                                                       Prob > chi2   =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.9674 
                                                       Root MSE      =   .6788 
 
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 26 clusters in id) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       unemp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      lunemp |   .7342957   .0306684    23.94   0.000     .6741867    .7944046 
 pension_exp |   .4428674   .1077885     4.11   0.000     .2316058    .6541289 
 labor_prodg |   .0798916   .0413435     1.93   0.053    -.0011402    .1609235 
        dtot |   .0244706   .0276283     0.89   0.376    -.0296798     .078621 
   inflation |  -.0089058   .0229309    -0.39   0.698    -.0538496     .036038 
 long_real_r |   .0667577   .0417892     1.60   0.110    -.0151476     .148663 
  trade_open |  -.0572864   .0180572    -3.17   0.002    -.0926778    -.021895 
        popd |   .0436688   .0133929     3.26   0.001     .0174191    .0699184 
 
 
ivregress 2sls unemp (lunemp =l2unem l3unem) health_exp labor_prodg dtot inflation 
long_real_r trade_open popd i.id i.year, robust cluster(id) 
 
 
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression               Number of obs =     375 
                                                       Wald chi2(50) = 3.5e+06 
                                                       Prob > chi2   =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.9659 
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                                                       Root MSE      =  .69349 
 
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 26 clusters in id) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       unemp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      lunemp |   .8030365   .0249686    32.16   0.000      .754099     .851974 
  health_exp |   .3109029   .1794451     1.73   0.083    -.0408032    .6626089 
 labor_prodg |    .062299   .0351671     1.77   0.076    -.0066273    .1312254 
        dtot |   .0101513   .0288148     0.35   0.725    -.0463246    .0666272 
   inflation |  -.0236476   .0216756    -1.09   0.275     -.066131    .0188357 
 long_real_r |   .0675084   .0400764     1.68   0.092    -.0110399    .1460566 
  trade_open |  -.0518844   .0180586    -2.87   0.004    -.0872786   -.0164902 
        popd |   .0430973   .0119786     3.60   0.000     .0196197    .0665749 
 
 
ivregress 2sls unemp (lunemp =l2unem l3unem) otherwelf labor_prodg dtot inflation 




Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression               Number of obs =     375 
                                                       Wald chi2(50) =12588.64 
                                                       Prob > chi2   =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.9649 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .70448 
 
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 26 clusters in id) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       unemp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      lunemp |   .7890314   .0313444    25.17   0.000     .7275975    .8504653 
   otherwelf |   .0037587   .1901528     0.02   0.984    -.3689339    .3764513 
 labor_prodg |   .0538326    .035667     1.51   0.131    -.0160734    .1237387 
        dtot |   .0058225   .0304363     0.19   0.848    -.0538316    .0654765 
   inflation |   -.022427   .0189378    -1.18   0.236    -.0595443    .0146903 
 long_real_r |   .0710718   .0419419     1.69   0.090    -.0111328    .1532764 
  trade_open |  -.0662793    .018416    -3.60   0.000     -.102374   -.0301845 
        popd |   .0433626   .0166439     2.61   0.009     .0107413     .075984 
 
ivregress 2sls unemp (lunemp =l2unem l3unem) public_social labor_prodg dtot inflation 
long_real_r trade_open popd i.id i.year, robust cluster(id) 
 
 
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression               Number of obs =     375 
                                                       Wald chi2(50) = 8819.41 
                                                       Prob > chi2   =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.9678 
                                                       Root MSE      =   .6741 
 
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 26 clusters in id) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       unemp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      lunemp |    .766701   .0319682    23.98   0.000     .7040446    .8293575 
public_soc~l |   .1674584   .0459158     3.65   0.000     .0774651    .2574518 
 labor_prodg |   .0554412   .0369588     1.50   0.134    -.0169968    .1278792 
        dtot |   .0171876   .0334096     0.51   0.607     -.048294    .0826692 
   inflation |   -.008232   .0220635    -0.37   0.709    -.0514757    .0350117 
 long_real_r |   .0585422   .0417584     1.40   0.161    -.0233028    .1403872 
  trade_open |  -.0453207   .0177931    -2.55   0.011    -.0801946   -.0104469 
        popd |   .0443245     .01568     2.83   0.005     .0135924    .0750567 
 
ivregress 2sls unemp (lunemp public_social =l2unem l3unem road) labor_prodg dtot 
inflation long_real_r trade_open popd i.id i.year, robust cluster(id) 
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression               Number of obs =     375 
                                                       Wald chi2(50) = 5697.98 
                                                       Prob > chi2   =  0.0000 
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                                                       R-squared     =  0.9513 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .82885 
 
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 26 clusters in id) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       unemp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      lunemp |   .7282918   .0754178     9.66   0.000     .5804756    .8761079 
public_soc~l |    .518727   .2346442     2.21   0.027     .0588328    .9786212 
 labor_prodg |   .0579023   .0476154     1.22   0.224    -.0354222    .1512268 
        dtot |   .0415089   .0564746     0.74   0.462    -.0691794    .1521971 
   inflation |   .0234542   .0380503     0.62   0.538    -.0511231    .0980315 
 long_real_r |   .0308355   .0465238     0.66   0.507    -.0603495    .1220205 
  trade_open |  -.0013795   .0412848    -0.03   0.973    -.0822963    .0795372 
        popd |   .0467045   .0537852     0.87   0.385    -.0587125    .1521215
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ivregress 2sls long_unem2 (l_lunem = l2_lunem l3_lunem) income_support labor_prodg dtot 
inflation long_real_r trade_open popd i.id i.year, robust cluster(id) 
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression               Number of obs =     353 
                                                       Wald chi2(50) = 6.7e+07 
                                                       Prob > chi2   =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.9765 
                                                       Root MSE      =  2.7082 
 
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 26 clusters in id) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  long_unem2 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     l_lunem |   .7320259    .057333    12.77   0.000     .6196552    .8443966 
income_sup~t |   1.317862   .4043498     3.26   0.001      .525351    2.110373 
 labor_prodg |   .1882131   .1113391     1.69   0.091    -.0300074    .4064337 
        dtot |  -.0325074   .0697008    -0.47   0.641    -.1691185    .1041037 
   inflation |  -.7067452   .1607473    -4.40   0.000    -1.021804   -.3916862 
 long_real_r |   .5762228   .1807229     3.19   0.001     .2220124    .9304332 
  trade_open |   .1519685   .1029486     1.48   0.140    -.0498071    .3537441 
        popd |   .0943562   .0719882     1.31   0.190     -.046738    .2354504 
 
 
ivregress 2sls long_unem2 (l_lunem = l2_lunem l3_lunem) pension_exp labor_prodg dtot 




Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression               Number of obs =     353 
                                                       Wald chi2(50) = 8245.34 
                                                       Prob > chi2   =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.9776 
                                                       Root MSE      =  2.6459 
 
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 26 clusters in id) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  long_unem2 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     l_lunem |   .6880062   .0478335    14.38   0.000     .5942543    .7817582 
 pension_exp |   1.654495   .2604187     6.35   0.000     1.144084    2.164906 
 labor_prodg |   .3406727   .0934281     3.65   0.000     .1575571    .5237884 
        dtot |   -.026193   .0704467    -0.37   0.710    -.1642661      .11188 
   inflation |  -.5793093   .1501008    -3.86   0.000    -.8735015   -.2851171 
 long_real_r |   .5282065   .1786167     2.96   0.003     .1781241    .8782889 
  trade_open |   .1401548   .0819458     1.71   0.087    -.0204559    .3007656 
        popd |   .0197707    .056277     0.35   0.725    -.0905302    .1300715 
 
ivregress 2sls long_unem2 (l_lunem = l2_lunem l3_lunem) health_exp labor_prodg dtot 
inflation long_real_r trade_open popd i.id i.year, robust cluster(id) 
 
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression               Number of obs =     353 
                                                       Wald chi2(50) = 9870.10 
                                                       Prob > chi2   =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.9755 
                                                       Root MSE      =  2.7681 
 
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 26 clusters in id) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  long_unem2 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     l_lunem |   .7336129   .0545622    13.45   0.000     .6266729    .8405529 
  health_exp |   .8738074   .6301635     1.39   0.166    -.3612903    2.108905 
 labor_prodg |   .2646194   .1064469     2.49   0.013     .0559874    .4732515 
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        dtot |  -.0763265   .0727534    -1.05   0.294    -.2189206    .0662676 
   inflation |  -.7282818   .1579045    -4.61   0.000    -1.037769   -.4187946 
 long_real_r |   .5718237   .1924187     2.97   0.003     .1946899    .9489575 
  trade_open |   .1237764   .1038968     1.19   0.234    -.0798576    .3274103 
        popd |   .0245113   .0581563     0.42   0.673    -.0894729    .1384956 
 
ivregress 2sls long_unem2 (l_lunem = l2_lunem l3_lunem) otherwelf labor_prodg dtot 
inflation long_real_r trade_open popd i.id i.year, robust cluster(id) 
 
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression               Number of obs =     353 
                                                       Wald chi2(50) = 1.7e+05 
                                                       Prob > chi2   =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.9752 
                                                       Root MSE      =  2.7837 
 
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 26 clusters in id) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  long_unem2 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     l_lunem |   .7258509   .0521257    13.93   0.000     .6236863    .8280154 
   otherwelf |  -.2256364   .4736192    -0.48   0.634    -1.153913    .7026403 
 labor_prodg |    .239329   .1128668     2.12   0.034     .0181141     .460544 
        dtot |  -.1086318   .0763188    -1.42   0.155    -.2582138    .0409503 
   inflation |  -.7299361   .1588897    -4.59   0.000    -1.041354   -.4185179 
 long_real_r |   .5907381   .1936602     3.05   0.002     .2111711    .9703052 
  trade_open |   .0804536   .0962893     0.84   0.403    -.1082699    .2691771 
        popd |    .035029   .0569873     0.61   0.539     -.076664     .146722 
 
 
ivregress 2sls long_unem2 (l_lunem = l2_lunem l3_lunem) public_social labor_prodg dtot 
inflation long_real_r trade_open popd i.id i.year, robust cluster(id) 
 
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression               Number of obs =     353 
                                                       Wald chi2(50) = 9924.05 
                                                       Prob > chi2   =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.9768 
                                                       Root MSE      =  2.6904 
 
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 26 clusters in id) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
  long_unem2 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     l_lunem |   .7181525   .0515055    13.94   0.000     .6172036    .8191015 
public_soc~l |   .6132837   .1540012     3.98   0.000     .3114469    .9151205 
 labor_prodg |   .2561821   .0997444     2.57   0.010     .0606867    .4516775 
        dtot |  -.0094886   .0722025    -0.13   0.895    -.1510029    .1320257 
   inflation |  -.6503701   .1510527    -4.31   0.000     -.946428   -.3543122 
 long_real_r |   .5542817   .1869979     2.96   0.003     .1877724    .9207909 
  trade_open |   .1765634   .0976091     1.81   0.070    -.0147469    .3678737 




Results for Youth unemployment rate: 
 
ivregress 2sls youth_unem2 (l_yunem = l2_yunem  l3_yunem) income_support labor_prodg 
dtot inflation long_real_r trade_open popd i.id i.year, robust cluster(id) 
 
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression               Number of obs =     375 
                                                       Wald chi2(50) = 2.9e+05 
                                                       Prob > chi2   =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.9647 
                                                       Root MSE      =  1.5695 
 
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 26 clusters in id) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
 youth_unem2 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     l_yunem |   .7814825   .0414114    18.87   0.000     .7003177    .8626473 
income_sup~t |   .5665372   .1640122     3.45   0.001     .2450791    .8879952 
 labor_prodg |   .0718007    .082548     0.87   0.384    -.0899904    .2335919 
        dtot |   -.010927   .0869184    -0.13   0.900    -.1812839      .15943 
   inflation |  -.0015539   .0420013    -0.04   0.970    -.0838749    .0807671 
 long_real_r |   .0823284   .0918369     0.90   0.370    -.0976685    .2623253 
  trade_open |  -.1079853   .0346505    -3.12   0.002     -.175899   -.0400717 
        popd |   .1032371   .0330802     3.12   0.002     .0384011    .1680732 
 
 
ivregress 2sls youth_unem2 (l_yunem = l2_yunem  l3_yunem) pension_exp labor_prodg dtot 
inflation long_real_r trade_open popd i.id i.year, robust cluster(id) 
 
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression               Number of obs =     375 
                                                       Wald chi2(50) =30208.95 
                                                       Prob > chi2   =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.9641 
                                                       Root MSE      =  1.5824 
 
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 26 clusters in id) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
 youth_unem2 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     l_yunem |    .750596   .0416223    18.03   0.000     .6690178    .8321741 
 pension_exp |   .6544925   .1951911     3.35   0.001     .2719251     1.03706 
 labor_prodg |   .1399398   .0926598     1.51   0.131    -.0416701    .3215497 
        dtot |   .0146773   .0709361     0.21   0.836     -.124355    .1537095 
   inflation |   .0027707   .0485481     0.06   0.954    -.0923818    .0979232 
 long_real_r |   .1014074   .0929162     1.09   0.275     -.080705    .2835198 
  trade_open |  -.1198733   .0402383    -2.98   0.003    -.1987389   -.0410077 
        popd |   .0773396   .0275597     2.81   0.005     .0233235    .1313556 
 
 
ivregress 2sls youth_unem2 (l_yunem = l2_yunem  l3_yunem) health_exp labor_prodg dtot 
inflation long_real_r trade_open popd i.id i.year, robust cluster(id) 
 
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression               Number of obs =     375 
                                                       Wald chi2(50) = 3116.18 
                                                       Prob > chi2   =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.9639 
                                                       Root MSE      =  1.5866 
 
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 26 clusters in id) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
 youth_unem2 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     l_yunem |   .8008507   .0358674    22.33   0.000     .7305519    .8711495 
  health_exp |   .6104667   .3802941     1.61   0.108     -.134896    1.355829 
 labor_prodg |   .1132283   .0829629     1.36   0.172    -.0493759    .2758325 
        dtot |  -.0051361   .0725136    -0.07   0.944    -.1472602    .1369881 
   inflation |  -.0237362   .0447449    -0.53   0.596    -.1114346    .0639622 
 long_real_r |   .1010832    .088689     1.14   0.254    -.0727441    .2749104 
  trade_open |  -.1055579   .0404467    -2.61   0.009     -.184832   -.0262838 
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        popd |   .0770716   .0268769     2.87   0.004     .0243938    .1297494 
 
 
ivregress 2sls youth_unem2 (l_yunem = l2_yunem  l3_yunem) otherwelf labor_prodg dtot 
inflation long_real_r trade_open popd i.id i.year, robust cluster(id) 
 
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression               Number of obs =     375 
                                                       Wald chi2(50) =89033.74 
                                                       Prob > chi2   =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.9632 
                                                       Root MSE      =  1.6018 
 
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 26 clusters in id) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
 youth_unem2 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     l_yunem |    .791093   .0416233    19.01   0.000     .7095128    .8726731 
   otherwelf |  -.2054234   .4467246    -0.46   0.646    -1.080987    .6701406 
 labor_prodg |   .1003547   .0835089     1.20   0.229    -.0633197    .2640292 
        dtot |  -.0180227   .0713057    -0.25   0.800    -.1577793     .121734 
   inflation |  -.0257165   .0378916    -0.68   0.497    -.0999827    .0485497 
 long_real_r |   .1097444   .0921855     1.19   0.234    -.0709358    .2904247 
  trade_open |  -.1371284    .044551    -3.08   0.002    -.2244467   -.0498101 
        popd |   .0862399   .0406757     2.12   0.034     .0065171    .1659627 
 
 
ivregress 2sls youth_unem2 (l_yunem = l2_yunem  l3_yunem) public_social labor_prodg dtot 
inflation long_real_r trade_open popd i.id i.year, robust cluster(id) 
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression               Number of obs =     375 
                                                       Wald chi2(50) = 3769.85 
                                                       Prob > chi2   =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.9643 
                                                       Root MSE      =  1.5768 
 
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 26 clusters in id) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
 youth_unem2 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     l_yunem |   .7740472   .0397045    19.50   0.000     .6962278    .8518667 
public_soc~l |   .2469093   .0724841     3.41   0.001     .1048431    .3889755 
 labor_prodg |   .1034618     .08622     1.20   0.230    -.0655262    .2724498 
        dtot |    .005552   .0802376     0.07   0.945    -.1517109    .1628149 
   inflation |   .0016986   .0446789     0.04   0.970    -.0858704    .0892676 
 long_real_r |   .0888479   .0916223     0.97   0.332    -.0907285    .2684243 
  trade_open |  -.1021094   .0373676    -2.73   0.006    -.1753486   -.0288703 




Mechanism (test the effect of welfare on investment rate): 
 
reg invrate income_support long_real_r inflation   trade_open  i.id i.year, robust 
cluster(id) 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     564 
                                                       F( 26,    27) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.6930 
                                                       Root MSE      =  1.9795 
 
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 28 clusters in id) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
     invrate |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
income_sup~t |  -.4789644   .2268682    -2.11   0.044    -.9444595   -.0134693 
 long_real_r |  -.2413778   .1376528    -1.75   0.091    -.5238181    .0410625 
   inflation |   .1206408   .0958505     1.26   0.219    -.0760281    .3173097 
  trade_open |  -.0317925   .0469124    -0.68   0.504    -.1280488    .0644638 
 
reg invrate pension_exp long_real_r inflation trade_open i.id i.year, robust cluster(id) 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     562 
                                                       F( 26,    27) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.7059 
                                                       Root MSE      =  1.9309 
 
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 28 clusters in id) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
     invrate |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 pension_exp |  -.7907701   .3079682    -2.57   0.016    -1.422669   -.1588717 
 long_real_r |  -.2833088   .1422675    -1.99   0.057    -.5752175       .0086 
   inflation |    .157987   .1010815     1.56   0.130    -.0494152    .3653891 
  trade_open |  -.0608208   .0389391    -1.56   0.130    -.1407173    .0190757 
 
reg invrate health_exp long_real_r inflation trade_open i.id i.year, robust cluster(id) 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     562 
                                                       F( 26,    27) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.6836 
                                                       Root MSE      =  2.0028 
 
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 28 clusters in id) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
     invrate |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  health_exp |  -.2696551   .4739368    -0.57   0.574    -1.242093    .7027828 
 long_real_r |  -.2956797   .1416053    -2.09   0.046    -.5862297   -.0051298 
   inflation |   .1755235   .0952116     1.84   0.076    -.0198345    .3708815 
  trade_open |  -.0403369   .0494224    -0.82   0.422    -.1417433    .0610694 
 
 
reg invrate otherwelf long_real_r inflation trade_open i.id i.year, robust cluster(id) 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     562 
                                                       F( 26,    27) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.6841 
                                                       Root MSE      =  2.0012 
 
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 28 clusters in id) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
     invrate |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
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-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   otherwelf |  -.3080616   .4781153    -0.64   0.525    -1.289073      .67295 
 long_real_r |  -.2873702   .1385626    -2.07   0.048    -.5716771   -.0030633 
   inflation |   .1627217   .0909899     1.79   0.085     -.023974    .3494175 
  trade_open |  -.0330175   .0430347    -0.77   0.450    -.1213173    .0552823 
 
 
reg invrate public_social long_real_r inflation trade_open i.id i.year, robust 
cluster(id) 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     562 
                                                       F( 26,    27) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.6997 
                                                       Root MSE      =  1.9511 
 
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 28 clusters in id) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
     invrate |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
public_soc~l |  -.2853569   .1258652    -2.27   0.032    -.5436108   -.0271029 
 long_real_r |  -.2539067   .1339099    -1.90   0.069    -.5286672    .0208537 
   inflation |   .1351478   .0964975     1.40   0.173    -.0628487    .3331442 








Adding migrate, replacing labor_prodg with mf_prodg, dtot with ldtot: 
 
IV strength and Endogeneity test again: 
quietly reg income_support road migrate long_real_r  mf_prodg ldtot inflation trade_open 
popd i.id i.year1 
test road 
 
 ( 1)  road = 0 
 
       F(  1,   224) =   18.01 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 
 
 
predict res1, res 
 
quietly reg  unemp income_support migrate mf_prodg ldtot inflation long_real_r trade_open 
popd  res1 i.id i.year 
test res1 
 
( 1)  res1 = 0 
 
       F(  1,   223) =    0.46 
            Prob > F =    0.4988 
 
 
ivregress 2sls unemp (lunemp =l2unem l3unem) income_support migrate mf_prodg ldtot 
inflation long_real_r trade_open popd i.id i.year, robust cluster(id) 
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression               Number of obs =     311 
                                                       Wald chi2(48) =  213.84 
                                                       Prob > chi2   =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.9686 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .63605 
 
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 18 clusters in id) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       unemp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      lunemp |   .6885277   .0349179    19.72   0.000     .6200899    .7569655 
income_sup~t |   .3961851   .1162357     3.41   0.001     .1683674    .6240029 
     migrate |  -.0954735   .0268171    -3.56   0.000    -.1480342   -.0429129 
    mf_prodg |   .0058156   .0374368     0.16   0.877    -.0675591    .0791904 
       ldtot |  -.1031845     .05679    -1.82   0.069    -.2144909    .0081218 
   inflation |   -.094292    .040844    -2.31   0.021    -.1743448   -.0142393 
 long_real_r |   .1615225   .0371535     4.35   0.000     .0887029    .2343421 
  trade_open |  -.0052589   .0176719    -0.30   0.766    -.0398951    .0293774 
        popd |   .0356811    .010835     3.29   0.001      .014445    .0569172
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ivregress 2sls unemp (lunemp =l2unem l3unem) pension_exp migrate mf_prodg ldtot inflation 
long_real_r trade_open popd i.id i.year, robust cluster(id) 
 
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression               Number of obs =     311 
                                                       Wald chi2(48) = 1473.33 
                                                       Prob > chi2   =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.9666 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .65579 
 
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 18 clusters in id) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       unemp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      lunemp |   .6526055   .0373616    17.47   0.000      .579378     .725833 
 pension_exp |   .4343474   .0989385     4.39   0.000     .2404315    .6282632 
     migrate |    -.08043   .0242648    -3.31   0.001    -.1279882   -.0328717 
    mf_prodg |   .0552249   .0442552     1.25   0.212    -.0315137    .1419634 
       ldtot |  -.0803346   .0504361    -1.59   0.111    -.1791876    .0185183 
   inflation |  -.1308432   .0482826    -2.71   0.007    -.2254753   -.0362112 
 long_real_r |   .2213412   .0393025     5.63   0.000     .1443097    .2983727 
  trade_open |  -.0196899   .0135556    -1.45   0.146    -.0462584    .0068785 
        popd |   .0127245   .0071749     1.77   0.076    -.0013381    .0267871 
 
 ivregress 2sls unemp (lunemp =l2unem l3unem) health_exp migrate mf_prodg ldtot inflation 
long_real_r trade_open popd i.id i.year, robust cluster(id) 
 
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression               Number of obs =     311 
                                                       Wald chi2(48) =  431.63 
                                                       Prob > chi2   =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.9645 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .67641 
 
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 18 clusters in id) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       unemp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      lunemp |   .7181498   .0430905    16.67   0.000     .6336939    .8026057 
  health_exp |   .2814924   .1961182     1.44   0.151    -.1028921    .6658769 
     migrate |  -.0880445   .0229711    -3.83   0.000     -.133067   -.0430221 
    mf_prodg |   .0215744   .0386862     0.56   0.577    -.0542492    .0973981 
       ldtot |  -.0957824   .0509818    -1.88   0.060    -.1957048      .00414 
   inflation |  -.1060943   .0348562    -3.04   0.002    -.1744112   -.0377773 
 long_real_r |   .2063192   .0390278     5.29   0.000     .1298261    .2828124 
  trade_open |  -.0139871   .0177727    -0.79   0.431    -.0488209    .0208468 
        popd |   .0064395     .00749     0.86   0.390    -.0082407    .0211197 
 
ivregress 2sls unemp (lunemp =l2unem l3unem) otherwelf migrate mf_prodg ldtot inflation 
long_real_r trade_open popd i.id i.year, robust cluster(id) 
 
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression               Number of obs =     311 
                                                       Wald chi2(48) = 1940.10 
                                                       Prob > chi2   =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.9632 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .68874 
 
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 18 clusters in id) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       unemp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      lunemp |   .6872738   .0329294    20.87   0.000     .6227333    .7518143 
   otherwelf |    .174408   .1924795     0.91   0.365    -.2028448    .5516608 
     migrate |  -.0938577   .0232369    -4.04   0.000    -.1394013   -.0483141 
    mf_prodg |   .0138016   .0405157     0.34   0.733    -.0656077     .093211 
       ldtot |  -.0970508   .0442879    -2.19   0.028    -.1838534   -.0102482 
   inflation |   -.106436   .0424389    -2.51   0.012    -.1896147   -.0232573 
 long_real_r |   .2027191   .0423847     4.78   0.000     .1196466    .2857915 
  trade_open |   -.023653     .01785    -1.33   0.185    -.0586383    .0113324 
        popd |  -.0001062    .010244    -0.01   0.992    -.0201841    .0199718 
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IV strength and Endogeneity test again: 
quietly reg public_social road migrate long_real_r  mf_prodg ldtot inflation trade_open 
popd i.id i.year1 
test road 
 ( 1)  road = 0 
 
       F(  1,   224) =   14.27 
            Prob > F =    0.0002 
 
predict res2, res 
 
quietly reg  unemp public_social migrate mf_prodg ldtot inflation long_real_r trade_open 
popd  res2 i.id i.year 
test res2 
test res2 
 ( 1)  res2 = 0 
 
       F(  1,   223) =    0.67 
            Prob > F =    0.4150 
 
 
 ivregress 2sls unemp (lunemp =l2unem l3unem) public_social migrate mf_prodg ldtot 
inflation long_real_r trade_open popd  i.id i.year, robust cluster(id) 
 
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression               Number of obs =     311 
                                                       Wald chi2(48) =  871.66 
                                                       Prob > chi2   =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.9681 
                                                       Root MSE      =    .641 
 
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 18 clusters in id) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       unemp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      lunemp |   .6821891   .0348031    19.60   0.000     .6139763    .7504019 
public_soc~l |   .1818228   .0522811     3.48   0.001     .0793536    .2842919 
     migrate |  -.0889248   .0236766    -3.76   0.000      -.13533   -.0425196 
    mf_prodg |    .040494   .0379791     1.07   0.286    -.0339437    .1149317 
       ldtot |  -.0859137   .0541539    -1.59   0.113    -.1920535     .020226 
   inflation |  -.0942172   .0433987    -2.17   0.030    -.1792771   -.0091572 
 long_real_r |   .1830374    .032071     5.71   0.000     .1201794    .2458954 
  trade_open |   .0002311   .0183256     0.01   0.990    -.0356864    .0361486 
        popd |    .017761   .0092389     1.92   0.055    -.0003469    .0358688 
 
 
Test the effect of government expenditure % of GDP on unemployment rate: 
 
 ivregress 2sls unemp (lunemp =l2unem l3unem)    govexp migrate mf_prodg ldtot inflation 
long_real_r trade_open popd  i.id i.year, robust cluster(id) 
 
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression               Number of obs =     279 
                                                       Wald chi2(46) = 1190.40 
                                                       Prob > chi2   =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.9669 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .66573 
 
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 18 clusters in id) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
       unemp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      lunemp |   .6780849   .0346005    19.60   0.000     .6102691    .7459007 
      govexp |   .3714099   .1016152     3.66   0.000     .1722478     .570572 
     migrate |  -.0921587   .0209745    -4.39   0.000     -.133268   -.0510495 
    mf_prodg |   .0711174   .0416845     1.71   0.088    -.0105828    .1528176 
       ldtot |  -.0171121   .0486578    -0.35   0.725    -.1124796    .0782555 
   inflation |  -.0698207    .049923    -1.40   0.162    -.1676679    .0280265 
 long_real_r |   .1938583   .0324263     5.98   0.000      .130304    .2574126 
  trade_open |  -.0028597   .0212046    -0.13   0.893      -.04442    .0387006 
        popd |  -.0088403   .0083691    -1.06   0.291    -.0252435    .0075629 
